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I.

INTRODUCTION

Cheryl Holmstrom, the plaintiff-appellant, submits this
Brief in reply to the Brief submitted by C.R. England and
Joseph Hyatt, the defendants-appellees.
Ms. Holmstrom stands by her legal analysis, and its
application to the instant dispute, that is set forth in her
Opening Brief.

She seeks to refrain from unnecessarily

repeating the arguments, regarding the correctness of which
she remains confident, that appear in that Brief.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

APPELLEES MISS THE POINT IN THEIR RESPONSE TO
MS. HOLMSTROM'S ARGUMENT REGARDING THE DISTRICT
COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE A "HAZARDOUS ROUTE"
INSTRUCTION. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE
THAT INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

As explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief, her
District Court case and trial presentation dealt, in
substantial part, with Mr. Hyatt's selection of a route that
he knew to be unsafe.

See, e.g., the parts of Mr. Hyatt's

trial testimony that are set forth at pages 34-36 of
Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief.

Mr. Hyatt testified, for

example, that he knew that the intersection of Park and
Division, for a driver, like himself, making a right turn from
Park onto Division, constituted a dangerous condition.
Vol. II, 124.

Tr.

Mr. Hyatt also acknowledged that he was, and

had been, for many years, familiar with the blind nature of

that turn, and that there was another route he could have
taken that would have avoided the problems associated with
turning from that blind intersection coupled with the S-curve
out of which Ms. Holmstrom was coming just before the
collision occurred {id.,

136-37).

There was, contrary to the

suggestion appearing in Appellees' Brief, utterly no evidence
that the route taken by Ms. Holmstrom (simply proceeding
westbound down Division) was hazardous or that she knew or
should have known it was hazardous.1

In any event, it is not

the stretch of road, given Ms., Holmstrom's theory of the case,
that was significant.

It was the route chosen by Mr. Hyatt in

his trip of driving his truck around the block that was
important.
Appellees' argument that Ms. Holmstrom had to define the
meaning of the word "hazardous" in the proposed instruction is
specious.
be defined.

Not every word in every jury instruction needs to
Also, given the evidence in the case and

Ms. Holmstrom's theory of liability, the series of rhetorical
questions posed by appellees at pages 5-6 of their Brief
should be accorded no significance.

1

Given the evidence

Although it is not directly relevant to the issue, Ms. Holmstrom's
counsel feel constrained to point out that Ms. Holmstrom's former
boyfriend, James Johnson, explained, at trial, that he had simply assumed
that Ms. Holmstrom was traveling a route she had frequently traveled, but
that he really did not know one way or another. Tr. Vol. IV, 584.
Ms. Holmstrom (the only other witness to testify on that subject) testified

2

presented, and Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case, it would
have been clear to the jury, if the proposed instruction had
been given, that the "hazardous" concept applied to
Mr. Hyatt's decision to make a right turn, from Park onto
Division, driving his long tractor unit, when he knew that he
would be required to initiate a blind turn without knowing
whether there was any vehicle coming through the S-curve.
Mr. Hyatt clearly acknowledged that that was the case and that
he knew he would have to pull into Ms. Holmstrom's lane of
travel to make the turn.

See record citations set forth at

page 35 of Holmstrom's Opening Brief.

For C.R. England and

Mr. Hyatt to suggest, in these circumstances, that "hazardous"
could have meant something to do with the presence of deaf or
blind children in the vicinity, the storing of hazardous
materials adjacent to the roadway, or that the road was
slippery or bumpy or in bad repair makes no sense and focuses
the beam of weakness on their argument with respect to this
aspect of this Appeal.
Appellees argue that Ms. Holmstrom "has failed to
establish any duty on the part of [Mr. Hyatt] to take a
different route."

Appellees' Brief at 6.

Ms. Holmstrom

acknowledges that there is no state statute or city ordinance

that she was not familiar with the route she was taking when the collision
occurred. Tr. Vol. Ill, 505.

3

on which her proposed instruction was based, but contends that
the principles of Utah case law cited in her Opening Brief (at
12) should be construed to apply to the operator of a motor
vehicle, and in the context of this case, the conduct of
Mr. Hyatt. Ms. Holmstrom has never contended, contrary to
appellees' argument, that drivers have a duty to take the
"least traveled" route.

Nor, contrary to appellees'

suggestion, has Ms. Holmstrom contended (nor does the proposed
instruction so read) that a driver's taking a hazardous route
necessarily renders that driver's conduct negligent.

It was

important to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case that the jury
be instructed that taking a hazardous route (here, Mr. Hyatt's
driving his truck on a route that would necessitate his
starting his turn when he could not see whether another
vehicle was coming and moving into that vehicle's lane of
travel, setting up an emergency response such as
Ms. Holmstrom's) could be considered by the jury to be an
index of negligence.

At page 6 of their Brief, appellees

further misstate Ms. Holmstrom's contention by saying that she
"complains of a blind S-curve, foliage near the corner and old
cars parked on the corner."
"complained of" such things.

Ms. Holmstrom has never
She has "complained of"

Mr. Hyatt's taking a route, given those considerations, that
was unsafe.

Nor has Ms. Holmstrom contended that "the
4

motoring public must cease using this public roadway/7
Appellees' Brief, at 6.

Her contention has been and remains

that Mr. Hyatt, especially driving the vehicle he was driving,
should not have driven a route that necessitated his making a
turn that he acknowledged was unsafe.
Appellees criticize Ms. Holmstrom for failing to lay out
the facts in the Utah cases and an Illinois case cited in her
Opening Brief, all of which deal with the conduct of
pedestrians.

Ms. Holmstrom's counsel are mindful of the fact

that the Court will read all cases cited and are of the view
that it is not always, if ever, necessary to burden a brief
with recitation of facts that can be and are easily found upon
review of cited cases.

In any event, the discussion during

the jury instruction conference (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14), which
was cited in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at page 12, makes
it clear that everyone involved in that conference knew that
these are pedestrian cases.

There is no secret, and never has

been, that the Utah cases upon which Ms. Holmstrom premised
her proposed jury instruction are pedestrian cases and that
they came about in an era when contributory negligence was a
complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery.

Neither of those

things makes an outcome-determinative difference.

The cases

brought to the attention of the District Court by
Ms. Holmstrom and cited in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief all
5

deal with the selection and taking of an allegedly unsafe
route by a party to a negligence lawsuit.

The concept is well

established that the selection of an unsafe route when safer
routes are available can lead to a finding of fault, not that
it must.

There is no reason, in law or in logic, why the same

principle recognized in the Utah cases should not be
determined to apply to driver conduct,2 by a defendant or a
plaintiff, any less than it does to a pedestrian plaintiff.
Appellees' argument, set forth at page 8 of their Brief,
that "plaintiff's negligence was at least equal to any
negligence she wants to bestow upon the defendant for the
defendant's use of that road," is perhaps the best example of
the weakness of appellees' response to Ms. Holmstrom's
argument and of the strength of Ms. Holmstrom's position.
First, the question at issue here is the giving of a jury
instruction which it was the District Court's duty to give,
consistent with Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case.

E.g.,

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); Startin v.
Madsen, 237 P.2d 835 (Utah 1951) (both cases cited at page 12
of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief).

It should have been left

to the jury to decide whether either driver's route selection

2

For a case in which a driver's selection of an unsafe route was
recognized tc be an index of negligence, see, Hathaway v. Coleman, 169 Pac.
414 (Cal. App. 1917).

6

was an index of that party's negligence.

Second, there was,

in connection with Ms. Holmstrom's conduct, utterly no
evidence —

nor did it have anything to do with appellees'

theory of the case —

that the route taken by Ms. Holmstrom

was supposedly hazardous or that Ms. Holmstrom knew or should
have known that the route that she was taking was supposedly
hazardous.
Appellees contend that any error inhering in the District
Court's failure to give the proposed instruction was harmless,
but appellees make no persuasive argument in favor of that
proposition.

As explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief,

at 13-16, the significance of the District Court's refusal to
give the requested instruction cannot be overstated.

The

Court's specifically instructing the jury on this index of
negligence would have been reasonably expected to tip the
scales for the jury to decide that Mr. Hyatt was "negligent
enough" to cause the jury to conclude that his negligence was,
indeed, a "substantial factor" in causing Ms. Holmstrom's
injuries and damages.

It is noteworthy that appellees have

not contested the correctness of this analysis, a lengthier
version of which is set forth in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief
at 12-13.
Without the

xx

hazardous route" instruction, and given the

theory of Ms. Holmstrom's case and the evidence that was
7

developed, the jury was, at best, left to wonder whether
Mr. Hyatt's selection of the unsafe route was meaningless in
the law.

As explained by this Court in Biswell v. Duncan, 724

P.2d 80, 88 (Utah App. 1987):

"failure to give a requested

jury instruction constitutes reversible error ... if the
omission ... insufficiently ... advises the jury on the law."
(Emphasis added.)

That is precisely the situation here, and

this Court should reverse and remand by reason of the Court's
refusal to give a jury instruction to Ms. Holmstrom was
entitled, regardless of what it does with the other issues on
appeal.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE "SUDDEN
PERIL" INSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY MS. HOLMSTROM
CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.

The "MUJI" stock instruction, number 4.3, dealing with
"sudden peril/' a situation in which Ms. Holmstrom, on the
essentially uncontroverted facts of this case, clearly and by
reason of Mr. Hyatt's making his blind turn found herself, is
ambiguously worded.

As Ms. Holmstrom's counsel explained in

the conference on jury instructions (Tr. Vol. V, 819-20), and
as she explained in her Opening Brief, at 18-19, there was a
substantial risk that if this "MUJI" instruction, as worded,
had been used, and if the jury had somehow determined that one
or more of the three discrete predicates set forth in that
stock instruction had not been satisfied, the jury would
8

conclude that it had no choice but to determine that there was
no proximate cause connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence
and Ms. Holmstrom' s injuries and damages.

The "sudden peril"

instruction, in concept, is a pro-plaintiff instruction that
fits some, but not all situations.
instant situation.

It fit, in concept, the

Ms. Holmstrom submitted a proposed

instruction which was not ambiguous, which correctly stated
the law, and which was, contrary to the District Court's
determination (Tr. Vol. V, 820), not confusing.

It

substantially varied from the MUJI instruction only in its use
of the language "if, but not only if" as opposed to simply
"if."

It, like the unsafe route instruction, was central to

Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case.

Under the authority of

Watters v. Query, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981) (see quote set
forth at pages 15 and 16 of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief),
and the Hamilton, Startin, and Biswell cases cited in her
Opening Brief and hereinabove, Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to
have her theory of the case submitted to the jury, and it
constituted prejudicial, reversible error for the District
Court to refuse to give the instruction she proposed.
A review of the transcript of the jury instruction
conference dealing with the proposed instruction (Tr. Vol. V,
819-22) makes it clear that the District Court had determined
not to include the "if, but not only if" language and would
9

give a further modified instruction only if a "balancing
sentence" which stated that if the imminent peril was caused
by the plaintiff's own conduct the instruction should be
disregarded.

What appellees requested, and what the District

Court agreed would be appropriate, with respect to the
"disregarding" language, would have been unnecessary and
confusing surplusage.
Ms. Holmstrom acknowledges that there was no record of
further discussion or ruling of the District Court with
respect to the sudden peril instruction she submitted.

She

urges this Court nonetheless to recognize that the District
Court had made up its mind not to give the instruction
proposed by Ms. Holmstrom; and she calls to the Court's
attention her counsel's statement {id.,

820) that the proposed

instruction would be withdrawn if the District Court would
give the instruction only if the "if but not only if" language
were removed.

Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to accept the

proposition that, given her theory of the case, the District
Court committed reversible error in refusing to give the
instruction as submitted.

Any tinkering with the instruction

proposed would have led to a confusing and unsatisfactory
instruction; and the instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom was
the correct one to be given.

It was not incumbent on

Ms. Holmstrom's counsel, given the District Court's ruling and
10

statements, to try to come up with something that would
satisfy appellees' counsel and the District Court.
Accordingly, because the "sudden peril" instruction was
central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case, and because
there was nothing inaccurate or inappropriate or confusing
about the proposed instruction submitted by Ms. Holmstrom, the
Court should, whatever it does with the other issues in this
appeal, rule that the District Court's refusal to give the
instruction as submitted constituted reversible error and
should reverse and remand for a new trial.
C.

APPELLEES FAIL TO RECKON WITH THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF
THE COLLISION AND ERRONEOUSLY SUGGEST THAT
MS. HOLMSTROM IS ASKING THIS COURT TO IGNORE SETTLED
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION.

C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt grossly overplay and take out
of context the testimony of Ronald Probert, Ms. Holmstrom's
accident reconstructionist, on which they heavily rely for
their position in this appeal.

They cite and quote

Mr. Probert's trial testimony, at page 4 and at page 13 of
their Brief, for the proposition that the wreck would likely
have happened even if Mr. Hyatt had stayed in his own lane.
What they fail to reckon with and what is essential for the
Court to understand is the dynamic nature of the subject
collision.

C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt would apparently have

this Court believe that Mr. Hyatt's vehicle was in a

11

stationary location for a substantial period of time when
Ms. Holmstrom came obliviously along the road; that because
Ms. Holmstrom was so far over the center lane herself, the
wreck would have happened in any event; and that, therefore,
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was of no consequence.

The Court will

see, however, from its review of the trial transcript,
including those parts that are cited in Ms. Holmstrom's
Opening Brief, that the dynamics of the subject collision are
in fact similar to those involved in crashes that occur in the
following scenario:

one driver negligently goes across the

center line and the other driver, guessing wrong, thinks that
the first driver will stay in the wrong lane; the second
driver goes left but the first driver at the last instant goes
back into his own lane; the collision occurs in the first
driver's lane of travel; and the second driver, from a
superficial perspective, "causes" the collision.
Here, and as appellees' own accident reconstructionist,
Dr. Ronald Woolley, acknowledged (see discussion set forth in
Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at 41), this was a dynamic
situation unfolding.

Tr. Vol. Ill, 686. A careful reading of

the testimony of Dr. Woolley, especially those portions cited
at pages 41-42 of Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief, will cause
the Court to realize that Ms. Holmstrom was put into a
situation not of her making when Mr. Hyatt started his turn
12

and that she was attempting to react to what he was doing when
she attempted to swerve to where daylight was opening up (to
her left) and that, because her brakes locked, she went
straight ahead.

See unrebutted testimony of Ronald Probert,

Tr. Vol. II, 225-26.

One of the most telling pieces of

testimony in this regard was Dr. Woolley acknowledging that,
as Ms. Holmstrom was driving along, she didn't know that
Mr. Hyatt was going to make the wide turn he was attempting to
make and she didn't know he wasn't going to stop and be safe
(Tr. Vol. Ill, 733). There is no reason to doubt that
testimony of Dr. Woolley or that of Ms. Holmstrom's Dr. Paul
France, who testified, as explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening
Brief at 38-39, that Ms. Holmstrom's expectation when she
first saw the England truck creeping toward her to make a
right-hand turn would be that the truck was going to initiate
a right-hand turn without intruding into her driving space and
that she had to make a judgment at the time she realized that
the truck was coming too far out and coming into her lane of
travel (Tr. Vol. II, 298-99); that Ms. Holmstrom had a very
short time to make the judgment she had to make; and that it
was reasonable for her to assume that the driver of the truck
was going to do something to stay out of her way {id.,

319).

Given the entirety of the circumstances, and given the fact
that Ms. Holmstrom, like Mr. Hyatt, would take approximately a
13

second and a half (e.g., Woolley testimony, Tr. Vol. IV, 714)
to perceive and react to an imminent collision-causing
impetus, and that it would take Mr. Hyatt, from the time he
began to perceive and react until the time he stopped his
truck, three to four seconds {id.,

717-18), and that there was

only 125 feet between the time Ms. Holmstrom first saw the
truck and the point of collision {id.,

674-75), the only

reasonable inference is that Mr. Hyatt's truck came to a stop
almost immediately prior to impact.
Nor is there, given the dynamics of the situation, any
reason to doubt Ms. Holmstrom's own testimony that if the
truck had stopped when it was even close to being on its own
side of the road she would have made a slight adjustment to
the right and driven right on past the truck (Tr. Vol. Ill,
560-61).
Also inaccurate and unfair is appellees' contention
(Appellees' Brief at 13) that Ms. Holmstrom
suggests that any time a jury finds a defendant
negligent, that jury must also find that there was a
cause and effect relationship and that the defendant's
negligence must have played a substantial role in causing
the injuries.
Ms. Holmstrom has never suggested such a thing.

It is

simply that, on the facts of this particular case, where Ms.
Holmstrom unquestionably sustained severe injuries as a result
of the collision and where Mr. Hyatt's conduct was by no means
14

a de minimis

factor in causing the injuries, the jury's no-

proximate-cause verdict should not be allowed to stand.
D.

THERE WAS EITHER NO EVIDENCE UPON WHICH REASONABLE
JURORS COULD HAVE BASED THE NO-PROXIMATE-CAUSE
VERDICT, OR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THAT
VERDICT, AND THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO GRANT MS. HOLMSTROM'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL DIRECTED VERDICT AND MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JNOV OR TO GRANT HER A NEW TRIAL ON ALL
ISSUES.

The reason that Ms. Holmstrom has marshaled the evidence
conceivably in support of the jury's verdict is that the law
requires an appellant to do so.

The fact that it took five

pages of her Opening Brief to set forth all evidence
conceivably in support of a verdict does not mean that there
was any evidence that, when the case and the dynamics of the
collision are fully understood, truly supports the jury's noproximate-cause verdict.

Ms. Holmstrom's counsel have, in

setting forth what they have set forth, simply attempted to
comply with recognized rules of appellate procedure and
practice.

Ms. Holmstrom maintains that, when the evidence is

understood in context, there is either no evidence or
insufficient evidence that truly supports the jury's
conclusion that there was no cause-and-effeet relationship
between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's damages or
that Mr. Hyatt's negligence did not play a substantial role in
causing Ms. Holmstrom's injuries and damages.

15

For there is no

reason to think the injurious c o l l i s i o n would have happened if
Mr. Hyatt had not done what he did ( i n i t i a t i n g a turn i n t o a
b l i n d i n t e r s e c t i o n when he could not see Ms. Holmstrom's
vehicle coming and causing her to guess wrong in her emergency
reaction).

And, given the gravity of Mr. Hyatt's e r r o r s , as

compared to the lack, or paucity, of e r r o r s committed by
Ms. Holmstrom,3 there i s no evidence (for Rule 50 purposes), or
i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence (for Rule 59 purposes), to support the
conclusion that the negligence of Mr. Hyatt was so s l i g h t , or
the negligence, i f any, of Ms. Holmstrom was so great, as to
render Mr. Hyatt's negligence not " s u b s t a n t i a l " in causing
Ms. Holmstrom's i n j u r i e s and damages.
Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to review the portions of
the t r i a l evidence set forth in the marshaling section of her
Opening Brief (at pages 29-42) and to make i t s own
determination as to whether, when the evidence i s understood
in context, there was evidence s u f f i c i e n t ,

for Rule 50 or for

Rule 59 purposes, to support the v e r d i c t , keeping in mind t h a t

3

See, e . g . , Mr. H y a t t ' s own testimony t h a t he did not t h i n k Ms. Holmstrom
was a c t i n g unreasonably (Tr. Vol. I I , 159); t h a t he had t o y i e l d t h e r i g h t
of way (Tr. Vol. IV, 626); and h i s acknowledgment t h a t he s a i d something
l i k e " I d i d n ' t see you; I d i d n ' t see you" t o Ms. Holmstrom immediately
a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n occurred (Tr. Vol. I I , 161); a p p e l l e e s ' Dr. Woolley's
t e s t i m o n y t h a t Ms. Holmstrom was not d r i v i n g a t an unreasonable speed (Tr.
Vol. IV, 671-72); Dr. Woolley's testimony t h a t i t ' s "kind of n a t u r a l " when
one i s coming out of t h e S-curve t o " s l i c e t h e c o r n e r , kind of s t r a i g h t e n
out t h e curve" {id., 731); and the i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t
he does not t h i n k i t ' s unreasonable for people t o glance down a t a
speedometer or t o glance down a t a clock (Tr. Vol. V, 802).
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the focus needs to be on the cause-and-effeet and "substantial
role" prongs of proximate causation law and not on the
question of Mr. Hyatt's negligence (a fact found by the jury)
or Ms. Holmstrom's negligence (a question that the jury, given
the way the verdict form was laid out, never answered).
If it does not determine that the District Court
committed reversible error in refusing to give the "hazardous
route" instruction and/or the "sudden peril" instruction
propounded by Ms. Holmstrom, this Court should conclude, based
on all the evidence and all the circumstances, that the
District Court committed reversible error (1) in allowing the
question of the proximate cause connection between Mr. Hyatt's
negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's injuries and damages to go to
the jury and in denying her Rule 50(b) motion for partial
judgment notwithstanding the verdict on that question; or (2)
in denying Ms. Holmstrom's Rule 59-based motion for a new
trial on all issues, based on the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict.

Different standards, as

explained in Ms. Holmstrom's Opening Brief at 4-7, govern
these two separate questions.

Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court

to recognize that the District Court should have granted her
one or the other forms of relief, that its failure to do so
constituted reversible error, and that Ms. Holmstrom is,
accordingly, entitled to a new trial consistent with the
17

Court's determination as to which of those separate prongs of
her argument is correct,
E.

MS. HOLMSTROM STANDS BY HER CONTENTION THAT CASE LAW
FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORTS HER POSITION AND
POINTS OUT THAT APPELLEES HAVE BROUGHT TO THE
COURT'S ATTENTION NO CASE IN WHICH A NO-PROXIMATECAUSE DETERMINATION IN A SITUATION SIMILAR TO THIS
ONE HAS BEEN UPHELD.

As with their response to Ms. Holmstrom's citing of
pedestrian cases in connection with her unsafe-route jury
instruction argument, appellees criticize (Appellees' Brief at
18) Ms. Holmstrom for failing to lay out the facts of the
proximate-cause cases from other jurisdictions that she has
cited.

As with the criticism of her citing those pedestrian

cases, appellees' criticism in this regard is ill-founded.
Ms. Holmstrom assumes, as explained hereinabove, that the
Court will read cases that are cited.

Ms. Holmstrom submits

that a careful reading of the California, New York, and
Connecticut cases she had cited and discussed, at page 46-48
of her Opening Brief, will cause the Court to conclude that
the analyses set forth in those cases support her position
that, in circumstances such as those involved in this
litigation, no fair-minded jury could appropriately determine,
having found Mr. Hyatt negligent, that that negligence was not
a proximate cause of the wreck and, in the circumstances here
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present, of Ms. Holmstrom's concededly significant orthopedic
injuries and damages.
V. CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court, based on the record of
this case, the particulars of the dynamics leading to the
subject collision, and the points and authorities discussed in
her Opening Brief and in this Brief, to reverse the District
Court and to remand for new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

P>l

day of February, 2000.
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